Iris Young: Critiquing the Distributive Paradigm

Posted: Wed, Apr 29, 2026

Today

  • Young’s project
  • Young’s critique of the “distributive paradigm”
  • Reminder: Course evaluations

Young’s project

Properly learning from the social movements of the long 1950s (finally!) (p. 3).

  • Lesson 1: “Politics . . . concerns all aspects of institutional organization, public action, social practices and habits, and cultural meanings insofar as they are potentially subject to collective evaluation and decisionmaking” (p. 9).
    • Broader than the basic structure of society: All “institutional and social relations insofar as they are subject to collective decision” are political. [too broad?]
    • Still does not impose a conception of the good life: Justice addresses the “institutional conditions” for the good life, but does not pass judgments on “the preferences and ways of life of individuals or groups.” [too narrow?]
  • Lesson 2: “The concept of justice is coextensive with the political” (p. 9)
    • Justice is not limited to the distribution of goods (the “distributive paradigm”).
    • It is pragmatically important not to cede justice to its distributive conception (pp. 35–36). [cf: equality vs. equity]
  • Lesson 3: The political philosopher is a hearer not a scientist (pp. 4–5).
    • A critical perspective on current society does not have come from an objective independent measure situated nowhere in particular and therefore everywhere all at once (à la the original position).
    • It is possible from within our society. [how? philosophy enables us to imagine a different way of being]
  • Lesson 4: Political philosophy is a proper part of politics (p. 5).
    • Political philosophy is political discourse.
    • Arguments in political philosophy are not demonstrations of truth but pleads and addresses to fellow citizens.

The D-word

The distributive paradigm: Justice = “the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens among society’s members” (p. 15).

  • Overemphasizes the importance of the distribution of material goods at the expense of obscuring the broader scope of social justice.
  • When stretched to cover these broader aspects of justice (the distribution of “nonmaterial goods”), the analysis is misleading and limiting.

Young’s conception of justice

  1. The “end-pattern” of the distribution of material goods
  2. The social structures in which material goods are distributed
    1. Decisionmaking: “the rules and procedures according to which decisions are made” (pp. 22–23)
    2. Division of labor: Beyond the distribution of positions and tasks, the “range of tasks performed in a given position, the definition of the nature, meaning, and value of those tasks, and the relations of cooperation, conflict, and authority among positions” (p. 23).
    3. Culture: “The symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories, and so on through which people express their experience and communicate with one another” (p. 23)

Some examples to look at:

  • Citizens in MA & OH (pp. 19–20)
  • Media depictions of Black people (p. 20)
  • Clerical work (p. 20)

Super-D?

The distributive paradigm Ultra Pro Max: the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens, including nonmaterial benefits and burdens, among society’s members.

  • Distribution of “rights and duties”
  • Distribution of “opportunities”
  • Distribution of “self-respect”
  • Distribution of “power”

Young’s response: Mistaken social metaphysics obscures and limits justice.

  • Implicit conception of human beings as possessors of things rather than agents of action (p. 36).
  • Reification of social relations and processes into possessions (p. 37).
  • Rights, duties, and opportunities are not possessions but enablements (social relations) (pp. 25–26).
  • Self-respect is not a possession but an attitude (p. 27).
  • Power is not even a dyadic relation between the haves and have-nots; it is “widely dispersed and diffused” among agents of power who may not have power or even be priviledged (pp. 32–33).